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Clarifying Goals, Revitalizing Means: An Independent Evaluation of the Freedom
Online Coalition
Abstract
This independent evaluation of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) was commissioned by the Coalition
as it approaches its fifth anniversary. The FOC sought input into a wider strategic review they are carrying
out to assess its effectiveness with a particular focus on four areas – membership, governance and
structure, the Coalition’s efforts and activities, and funding.
Thirty interviews with government representatives, members of civil society, business representatives,
and academics were conducted between September 2015 and January 2016, along with an in-person
consultation with 14 stakeholders at the Internet Governance Forum in Brazil in November 2015. Desk
research on five similar types of organizations was used for comparative purposes.
The findings of this research show that there is significant support for the existence of the Coalition and
for it continuation as a government only coalition. However, there are a number of criticisms of the FOC,
including the lack of transparency about its activities, inadequate consequences for countries not
meeting their commitments, and frustration at the ambiguity of the aims and objectives of the Coalition,
and the few tangible results that have been produced so far. A number of respondents also talked about
the ways in which the Snowden revelations have complicated efforts to work on Internet freedom. There
are specific recommendations in each of the four areas covered in the evaluation, but the highest priority
suggestions for the Coalition moving forward are as follows:

• Clarify the aims and objectives of the Coalition;
• Increase the legitimacy of the Coalition by establishing a mechanism through which
stakeholders can raise concerns about the actions of a member government;
• Institute a mechanism whereby members’ performance at meeting their commitments
can be periodically reviewed;
• Establish more stable funding for the Coalition through the introduction of multi-year
commitments and a tiered funding model;
• Create a formal link between the working groups and the FOC’s governance in order to
ensure that outputs from the working groups are considered and responded to by the FOC;
• Improve the Coalition’s communication, clarifying membership criteria and rendering more
transparent, to the extent possible, its diplomatic interventions.
The Coalition is still a young institution and some of the issues it faces are a reflection of this. However,
there are areas that the FOC must address to increase its effectiveness. Ultimately, the question for the
Coalition is whether it can rise to the challenge of leading the global conversations that will drive action
and policy making on Internet freedom in an increasingly complex world.
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Executive Summary
As the Freedom Online Coalition approaches its five
year anniversary, it commissioned this research to review the cumulative work of the Coalition, assess its
effectiveness and specifically get feedback on four key
areas – membership, governance and structure, the
Coalition’s efforts and activities, and funding.
Thirty interviews with government representatives,
members of civil society, business representatives, and
academics were conducted between September 2015
and January 2016, along with an in-person consultation
with 14 stakeholders in Brazil in November 2015. Desk
research was also conducted on five similar types of
organizations for comparative purposes.
The findings of this research show that there is significant support for the existence of the Coalition and for
it continuing as a government only coalition. However,
there are also a number of criticisms of the FOC, including the lack of transparency about its activities,
inadequate consequences for countries not meeting
their commitments, and frustration at the ambiguity of
the aims and objectives of the Coalition and the few
tangible results that have been produced so far. A
number of respondents also talked about the ways in
which the Snowden revelations have complicated efforts to work on Internet freedom. There are specific
recommendations in each of the four areas covered in
the evaluation, but the highest priority suggestions for
the Coalition moving forward are as follows:
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• Clarify the aims and objectives of the Coalition;
• Increase the legitimacy of the Coalition by establishing a mechanism through which stakeholders
can raise concerns about the actions of a member government;
• Institute a mechanism whereby members’ performance at meeting their commitments can be
periodically reviewed;
• Establish more stable funding for the Coalition
through the introduction of multi-year commitments and a tiered funding model;
• Create a formal link between the working groups
and the FOC’s governance in order to ensure that
outputs from the working groups are considered
and responded to by the FOC;
• Improve the Coalition’s communication, clarifying membership criteria and rendering more
transparent, to the extent possible, its diplomatic
interventions.
The Coalition is still a young institution and some of
the stumbling blocks it faces are a reflection of this.
However, there are issues that the FOC must address
to increase its effectiveness. Ultimately, the question
for the Coalition is whether it can rise to the challenge
of leading the global conversations that will drive action
and policy making on Internet freedom in an increasingly complex world.
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Introduction
Launched in 2011 in The Hague soon after the revolution in Tunisia and political upheaval across the Middle
East, the Freedom Online Coalition was first formed as
a loose Coalition of 15 countries working to advance
Internet Freedom.1 At its foundation is the principle that
offline human rights ought to apply online and that a
free and open Internet is in service of human rights and
contributes to development and economic growth. The
Tallinn declaration several years later added further
detail to the focus and commitments of the Coalition.2
The website of the Coalition has more information
about its work.3
The landscape of Internet freedom has evolved dramatically since 2011 and the Coalition has itself
undergone considerable expansion and development
since its formation. It now has 29 members (see Annex
A for a full list of members) and has established working groups on specific aspects of Internet freedom that
include members of civil society, industry representatives and academics.

and is supported by the Friends of the Chair, a group
of the most involved countries in the Coalition, including the previous Chair. The Coalition is supported by
an external Secretariat that provides coordination, administrative support and acts as a point of contact for
anyone wanting to know more about the Coalition.
In the last five years, the broader Internet freedom and
Internet governance agendas have developed significantly. Before this, the Tunis Agenda that emerged
from the 2003 Geneva World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and 2005 WSIS in Tunis led to the
creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The
IGF brings together several thousand stakeholders
from civil society, business, academia and the technical community at an annual week-long event to discuss
public policy issues relating to the Internet. A number
of regional and national IGFs have been created to
continue those discussions at a more local level.5

The day-to-day activity of the Coalition is led by the
Coalition Chair, who rotates on an annual basis. The
Chair also hosts the annual conference in their country

In the years since the Arab Spring, which jettisoned
concerns about free expression and privacy to the top
of the global agenda, the topic of online human rights
has been a prominent feature at the IGF. Following the
resolution passed at the Human Rights Council in 2012
that the same rights that apply offline also apply online,
there have been a number of reports produced by the
UN in the last few years focused on issues related to
Internet freedom and human rights.6 The first was by
Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Expression and
Opinion.7 The following year saw “The Right to Privacy
in the Digital Age” published, which led to the creation
of the first Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy.8
In 2015, David Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur on

1

5

The FOC’s primary efforts in its first couple of years
were hosting an annual Internet Freedom conference
and the creation of the Digital Defenders Partnership,
a fund for individuals and organizations working to
defend a free and open Internet who may have found
themselves at risk. In 2013, three working groups were
established that brought that brought other stakeholders (civil society, business, and academics) to the
FOC’s table.4

2

3
4

Freedom Online: Joint Action for Free Expression on
the Internet, Publication, February 2013, https://www.
freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/1-TheHague-FOC-Founding-Declaration-with-Signatories-as-of-2013.
pdf.
Ministers of the Freedom Online Coalition, Recommendations
for Freedom Online, Publication, April 28, 2014, https://www.
freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/FOCrecommendations-consensus.pdf
Freedom Online Coalition, last modified April 2016, https://www.
freedomonlinecoalition.com/
Working group 1 – A free and secure Internet; Working group 2
- Digital development and openness; Working group 3 – Privacy
and transparency online

6

7

8

“IGF Initiatives,” Internet Governance Forum, last modified
2016, http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf-initiatives.
United Nations, Human Rights Council, 20/8. The Promotion,
Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet,
Geneva: United Nations, 2012, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/
dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/20/8
United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, By Frank LaRue, Geneva:
United Nations, 2011, how to http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.
HRC.23.40_EN.pdf.
United Nations, United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, Geneva: United
Nations, 2014. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf.
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the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Expression and Opinion, produced a report on encryption that
explored whether or not free expression and privacy
rights protect secured communication using encryption
and anonymity and the extent to which governments
can impose restrictions.9
The 2013 Snowden revelations about the surveillance
activities of the National Security Agency in the US
and Government Communications Headquarters in the
UK rocked Internet policy communities worldwide and
shone a spotlight on the activities of liberal democracies as well as repressive states.
A number of organizations have emerged in recent
years that concentrate on these issues, for example the
Global Network Initiative, which brings tech companies
together with human rights organizations, investors
and academics. Established organizations such as the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, AccessNow, Bytes for All, the Centre for
Internet and Society, Derechos Digitales and Privacy
International are either fully focused on these issues
or have incorporated them into their work. Many foundations that fund civil society work are increasingly
9

David Kaye, “Report on Encryption, Anonymity, and the Human
Rights Framework,” The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/CallForSubmission.aspx.
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developing specific digital rights programs including
HIVOS, which runs the Digital Defenders Partnership
launched by the FOC.
Within this landscape, the FOC is uniquely a government-only coalition focused on Internet freedom. This
gives it the opportunity to advance the cause of Internet
freedom through diplomatic interventions and its Digital
Defenders Partnership as well as facilitating communication and contact between governments and other
stakeholders within the working groups.
The Freedom Online Coalition commissioned this independent evaluation as it approaches the fifth year since
its launch, with the intention of assessing the work of
the Coalition to date, getting feedback from stakeholders, and seeking recommendations to increase
the FOC’s future effectiveness. There was particular
interest in four areas – membership of the FOC, the
governance and structure of the FOC, feedback on the
importance of the current activities of the Coalition, and
funding. This report will feed into a wider review of the
FOC’s work that is being run by a working group within
the Coalition. The recommendations in this report are
a combination of those that come from the author, as
well as those that came from synthesizing interviewee
and consultation responses.
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Methodology
The research for this evaluation was carried out during
September 2015 to January 2016 using a combination of in-person and phone interviews, an in-person
consultation at the Internet Governance Forum (IGF)
in João Pessoa, Brazil in November 2015, and desk
research.
Two interview questionnaires, one for government
members and one for all other stakeholders, were designed to extract feedback from respondents about the
four key areas of the evaluation – membership of the
Coalition, the governance and structure of the FOC,
the current focus of activities of the FOC, and funding.
The questionnaire for government members included
a greater degree of detail, reflecting the fact that they
are more closely involved in the day-to-day work of the
FOC. Opinions were also sought about sought about
Coalition successes thus far, challenges and opportunities that the Coalition faces and what what benefits
people see from working with or being part of the Coalition.
The desk research was designed to complement the
information gathered from the primary research to provide useful comparative information on these issues as
the recommendations were drawn up. The same four
areas of interest (membership, governance, focus of
activities, and funding) were reviewed over five similar
organizations (The Community of Democracies, The

Open Government Partnership, The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Extractives
Industry Transparency Initiative and the International
Code of Conduct Association).
Thirty interviews were carried out with government
representatives from the Coalition, members of the Coalition working groups, and other external stakeholders
not involved in the Coalition’s work. Government
representatives, civil society organizations, industry
representatives, and academics were interviewed.
The author was given the names of government representatives and working group members by the FOC
from which a list of interviewees was developed. Ten
government representatives were interviewed and
twenty non-government members, including four company representatives, seven from civil society, three
academics and six Internet freedom experts who are
not currently involved in the FOC’s work.
At the IGF, 14 people representing different stakeholder groups attended a 90 minute focus group-like
consultation and were asked the same set of questions. Government representatives were not present at
the consultation in Brazil.
The Center for Global Communications Studies at the
University of Pennsylvania provided project support,
methodological guidance, and editorial assistance.
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Findings
The first section of the questionnaire asked a series of
general questions about motivation for joining the FOC,
benefits of membership, successes and shortcomings
of the organization, as well as the the FOC’s challenges and opportunities.

Reasons for Joining the Coalition
and the Benefits of Membership
When government members were asked why they had
joined the FOC, the most frequent response was a desire to support the Internet freedom agenda in the face
of restrictions to a free and open Internet that were being seen around the world.

“In 2011, Internet freedom was already
one of the top priorities for the Swedish government. Trying to build a group
on these issues that could be a stronger
voice on an international level was a key
motivation.”
Frida Gustafsson, Attaché, Permanent Delegation
of Sweden to the OECD and UNESCO

“The restrictions we were seeing being
placed on the Internet in many parts of
the world at the time were a key reason
for it being established.”
Stephen Lowe, Freedom of Expression Team Leader, Human Rights and Democracy Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK

“The Coalition brings together three
issues that are very important to Costa
Rica: Human rights, the respect for freedom, and the Internet.”
Mario Hernandez, official of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Costa Rica in the team for the Freedom
Online Coalition
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From the perspective of the Coalition’s government
members, the most frequently mentioned benefit of
membership was improved diplomatic coordination
and the opportunity to work with like-minded government partners to break through some of the traditional
diplomatic blocks. Because the Coalition’s structure
combines member governments and the involvement
of other stakeholders through the working groups and
because the nature of diplomacy is often off the record,
this benefit is largely invisible to those interviewees outside government and did not feature in their responses.
Other benefits that Government representatives highlighted included:
• Demonstrating to other parts of their own
governments that it is possible to work
constructively
with
other
stakeholders,
particularly civil society;
• Facilitating engagement with other parts
of government on Internet freedom and its
connectedness with other issues such as cyber
security and national security;
• Raising the visibility of their government at
international events such as the IGF;
• Using the Coalition as a valuable venue to talk
about security and human rights concerns;
• Facilitating the use of diplomatic channels to
progress towards the 2012 Human Rights Council
resolution regarding the same rights applying
online that apply offline;
• Increasing knowledge within government of
rapidly evolving technology and the potential
implications for human rights.

“It has been a reasonably constructive
space to discuss how we balance our
need for national security with our human rights obligations.”
Stephen Lowe, Freedom of Expression Team Leader, Human Rights and Democracy Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK

MAY 2016
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“When we are talking about Internet
freedom we can say we are working
with a lot of other countries through the
Freedom Online Coalition, so it is useful
public diplomacy.”

• Its uniqueness as a coalition of like-minded
states;

Australian government official

In contrast, when asked about the benefits of being
involved in the FOC, non-governmental stakeholder responses were inflected differently. For example, these
respondents appreciated the collective sharing of challenges among stakeholders, gaining insight into the
way in which governments work on Internet freedom
both publicly and privately, learning about dilemmas
faced by companies, finding areas of common interest
to work on, as well as the role the FOC working groups
play in sustaining a global, multistakeholder conversation about Internet freedom.

“There is a lot of US expertise on these
issues among non-government stakeholders so having people from other
countries in the working groups helps
that expertise to develop and also
makes sure that voices and perspectives
from other countries are included.”

• The Digital Defenders Partnership.

“The Tallinn Agenda makes it possible
for companies operating in those markets to have a conversation about their
commitments.”
Patrik Hiselius, Senior Advisor, Digital Rights,
Teliasonera

“One of their successes is that it created a space for governments to have
conversations when they didn’t have the
forum or the space to do so.”
Eduardo Bertoni, Global Clinical Professor, New
York University, School of Law

FOC Shortcomings
A majority of respondents mentioned the lack of concrete deliverables and the difficulty in pointing to
specific impacts the Coalition has had as shortcomings. Common responses include:

Stefan Heumann, Member of the management of
Stiftung neue verantwortung

• A lack of clarity on what the Coalition is and what
it is trying to achieve;

The FOC’s Successes

• The challenge of pointing to tangible results and
successes since the creation of the Coalition and
the need to create clearer metrics to measure
successes;

Respondents across all stakeholder groups most
frequently cited the FOC’s creation of a space for
government coordination and engagement on critical
topics with other stakeholders through the working
groups as a success.
Other successes cited include:
• The growing number of member states;
• The quality of the substance and discussion in
the working groups;
• The fact that the annual conferences have been
held in locations around the world, including the
Global South;

• The need for better external communication
about the Coalition’s work;
• Poor senior level government attendance at the
most recent FOC conferences.
Depending on the stakeholder affiliation of the respondent, shortcomings were expressed differently. For
example, government representatives were more likely
to talk about the challenge of defining the FOC’s work
post-Snowden, but other stakeholder groups were
more likely to talk about hypocrisy and questioned
whether signing up to the FOC commitments is making
any tangible difference in member countries.

• Opening up conversations on critical subjects
and raising awareness of Internet freedom;
Page 9
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Other shortcomings mentioned include:
• The relative weight of resources and institutional
emphasis given to cyber security rather than
Internet freedom within governments;
• The invisibility of the diplomatic work of the
Coalition to those outside the FOC (including to
members of the working groups);
• The lack of a significantly diverse global
membership;

MAY 2016

Challenges and Opportunities
for the FOC
Respondents registered both frustration and optimism
when asked about challenges and opportunities for the
FOC. Some were skeptical about its ability to achieve
meaningful change but others were more optimistic
that concrete achievements were just a matter of time,
especially if the FOC actively confronts roadblocks
such as the different levels of interest among member
states.

• The perceived inadequate response to the growth
of restrictions on Internet freedom, including
among FOC member countries;

Other challenges identified included:

• The uneven capacity among member countries
and its impact on active involvement in the
Coalition;

• Keeping members engaged and committed to a
strong set of principles;

• A lack of clarity on whether the principles of the
Coalition are being followed by members and
unclear consequences for membership if they
are not;
• The slow pace of progress in the working groups
(particularly in Working Group Two on Digital
Development and Openness) and the creation of
joint statements from the FOC.

“I’ve seen very little media coverage
of anything the FOC does, and I think
journalists who cover these things have
probably not heard of the FOC. That is
unfortunate.”
Rebecca MacKinnon, Director, Ranking Digital
Rights at New America

• Broadening membership geographically;

• Creating greater clarity on the added value of the
FOC and what it is trying to achieve;
• The discrepancy between what members of the
FOC have committed to and what they do in
practice;
• The need for some kind of accountability
mechanism to address instances in which
member governments are not meeting their
Internet freedom commitments;
• Developing specific indicators and measures of
success;
• Recapturing
revelations;

credibility

after

the

Snowden

• Ensuring that the people in the room have the
authority within their governments to make

policy.

“There’s a major tension point now with
what the purpose of the FOC is. We have
to figure out what we can all work on together in order to improve our goals.”

Opportunities:

Chris Riley, Head of Public Policy, Mozilla

• Building on the solid foundation that already
exists among the working groups to deliver high
quality, substantive outputs;

• Promising growth in the membership of the
Coalition and the opportunity to involve a broader
range of governments in its mission;

• Championing an online human rights framework
through the establishment and promotion of best
practices in Internet policy-making;
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• Facilitating honest discussion among members
about the challenge of meeting FOC commitments
in the present global environment;

see a greater link between the working groups and the
FOC.

• Creating something like the Universal Periodic
Review to evaluate progress on member
commitments;10
• Acting as a counterweight to the top down
vision of Internet governance promoted by some
authoritarian states;
• Developing a capacity-building model that offers
added value to FOC members.

“The FOC could potentially be a platform through which best practices get
established and promoted and that
would be a very good thing…. I’ve seen
some evidence of best practices being suggested by the working groups
but I’m not seeing any evidence of best
practices being implemented by governments yet.”
Rebecca MacKinnon, Director, Ranking Digital
Rights at New America

Membership of the Coalition11
Respondents were asked whether they thought other
stakeholders should become full members of the Coalition. The majority of all interviewees (22) thought
Coalition membership should continue to be government only. Two were supportive of making it a
multistakeholder initiative and six either didn’t have a
view or didn’t know. Several people commented on
the difficulty of having a firm view on this until there is
greater clarity on the overall purpose of the Coalition.
Some respondents, although supportive of the idea of
retaining it as a government-only coalition, wanted to
10 “Universal Periodic Review,” United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, last modified in 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx.
11 The remaining parts in this section of the report break down the
responses that were received on the four key areas of membership, governance and structure, the focus of the activities of the
FOC and finances. The number of respondents in this report
is too small to meaningfully break out into percentages along
the different stakeholder groups. Where there are particularly
interesting differences in the responses between different stakeholder groups these are pointed out.

Since its launch in 2011, the Coalition has grown from
15 to 29 members. When asked about whether continuing to grow the membership of the Coalition was
important, 17 respondents wanted to see a greater
emphasis on the quality of membership rather than
the quantity of members. Once again, many respondents said that this decision depends on more clarity
about the purpose and objectives of the Coalition itself.
Several respondents pointed out that it shouldn’t be a
binary choice between growing the Coalition or not, but
more about ensuring better geographic and regional
membership of the Coalition in a way that does not
negatively impact its principles. Ten respondents (six
of them government respondents) were of the view that
growing the membership should be the priority, and
three respondents did not have an opinion on this topic.

“I would definitely go for a high bar
rather than a universal approach. If
you’re going to call it the Freedom Online Coalition then the goal should be to
preserve freedom online and create certain conditions for membership.”
David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression

Many respondents did not have strong views on whether the current, fairly informal procedure to join the FOC
should be made more formal. Thirteen (six of whom
were government members) were in favor of adopting
a more formal procedure, five were not in favor, and 12
either had no view or didn’t know. Many of the nongovernment respondents were unaware of the current
procedure.
There was support for the idea of creating a tiered level
of membership or some kind of observer status from 19
respondents. Three were not supportive, and eight did
not express an opinion.
One of the key issues this evaluation addressed is
whether membership in the FOC should entail ongoing
commitments. In the current model, once a government has joined, there is a requirement to uphold the
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founding principles, but there is no mechanism of enforcement. There was almost unanimous support for
some manner of standard, continued commitments for
FOC members across all categories of respondents.
Only two interviewees expressed reservations, largely
around how practical it would be to introduce ongoing
commitments at this stage.

“I think there should be some sort of
standard that members keep up to and
some obligation that they should respect and fulfill.”
Mario Hernandez, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Costa Rica official on the Freedom Online Coalition
team

Determining a set of commitments for FOC members is
inextricably linked with the Coalition’s goals. The core
issue to be determined is whether the Coalition is an
outward facing initiative seeking impact on the ground
or a more inwardly focused organization concerned
with monitoring the performance of members who
have made a commitment to Internet freedom. Many
participants in this evaluation thought the Coalition
needed to establish a mechanism for demonstrating whether or not member governments are meeting
their commitments. Interviewees most frequently cited
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) that takes place
through the UN Human Rights Council as an example
of how this might be done. The UPR could be used as
the basis to develop a similar type of mechanism for
the FOC. Alternatively, issues of Internet freedom already appear in the UPR process itself and it would be
worth exploring the possibility of this being increased
so that outcomes from the UPR could be part of the
FOC mechanism.
A number of interviewees brought up the failure of
some governments to play an active role in the Coalition, citing the lack of participation from a number of
governments at the 2015 annual FOC conference in
Ulaanbaatar as an example. Lack of resources among
some countries contributes to this issue, but respondents felt there should be minimum requirements,
including attendance at the annual conference, in order
to be members in good standing of the FOC.
Suspension or removal from the Coalition, and what
(if anything) ought to trigger it, was the final section
of the questionnaire’s section on membership. Even
Page 12

MAY 2016

though the Coalition is a voluntary, government-only
organization, there was remarkable consensus among
respondents that there ought to be a mechanism to either suspend or remove members.

“While there is desire to expand membership in the FOC to increase global
awareness and support for freedom
online, there should be a vehicle or
mechanism for challenging members in
their failure to live up to their commitment.”
Eileen Donohoe, Director of Global Affairs, Human
Rights Watch

Some respondents had concerns about the practicality
of implementing and enforcing these mechanisms. A
contingent felt FOC members should be able to vote
to remove members, but several pointed to the challenges of voting to remove members, given potential
diplomatic issues that could arise. One government
representative suggested a connection between a
periodic review and a reaffirmation of a government’s
commitment to being a member of the Coalition every few years. Several respondents wanted to see the
same governance process for both joining the Coalition
and potential removal or suspension of membership.

Recommendations
• Keep the Coalition’s membership restricted
to governments but review this in two to four
years. At this stage, the FOC’s government-only
composition is its uniqueness but, as its efforts
progress, bringing stakeholders formally into
the governance structure may make sense and
should not be ruled out;
• Create a mechanism for a stakeholder from
each working group to act as a liaison between
the working group and FOC members. This will
help build trust and more open communication
between the FOC and the working groups;
• Develop clearer membership criteria that
explains the ongoing expectations for members
and aids other stakeholders’ understanding
these commitments;12
12 For example, who is involved in the decision, and a publicly
available process for applying. The application process should
include a self-assessment from the applying Government on
their current performance measured against the Coalition’s
principles.
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• After the Coalition’s rapid growth, it should
suspend new membership for a period of 12
months to consider the other recommendations
from this report and implement its response;

possible scenario where all members step down or rotate at the same time.

• Institute minimum membership participation
standards, such as participation in the annual
conference;
• Revisit the idea of an observer status for the
Coalition within two years;
• Create a mechanism for stakeholders to raise
concerns about the performance of a particular
Coalition member which includes the requirement
for the member government to respond;
• Over the longer term, create a review mechanism
(possibly every three years) for Coalition
members’ progress to be evaluated, using the
Universal Periodic Review as a model. During the
development of this mechanism, the Coalition
will need to consider whether to introduce the
potential suspension or removal of members.

Governance and Structure of the
Coalition
Government respondents were asked a more detailed
set of questions about the FOC’s day-to-day functioning.
These focused on the role of the Chair, the Friends of
the Chair and the Secretariat.
Many government interviewees felt a tension between
the current informal arrangements for governance and
the potential need to evolve into a more formal structure as the Coalition matures.
When asked if there needed to be a more formal way
of selecting the Chair, the majority of respondents
(seven out of ten) were in favor of the current informal
process. Currently, the Chair of the FOC hosts the annual conference, and a number of respondents noted
that this can be a burden on non-Western states with
more limited resources, and is contradictory to the desire among members to see more even participation
among member states. Three people suggested the
creation of a rotating Vice-Chair that would host the
conference, easing the Chair’s burden. Nine of the ten
government representatives interviewed thought that
the development of terms of reference for the Friends
of the Chair would be beneficial, particularly one which
ensures continuity within the group and precludes a

In comparison, all five organizations whose structures
were reviewed (see Annex B) have a more formal overall structure, including a board, board terms and the
development of an overall governance framework. With
the exception of the Open Government Partnership,
however, the FOC is a much younger organization,
which may help to explain this informality.

The Secretariat
Global Partners Digital, a London-based social purpose
company, currently provides the Secretariat support for
the Coalition. This service is currently done on a one
year contract basis. Government representatives were
very complementary about the support they receive
and the vital role that the Secretariat provides in keeping the Coalition on track.
The questionnaire tailored to FOC government members asked respondents their opinion about the
establishment of a permanent Secretariat (all the
comparative organizations reviewed have established
one, with the exception of the Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights – see Annex B). There
was provisional support from six government members
for the creation of a permanent Secretariat, although
many of those who supported the idea raised practical
concerns such as the current lack of long-term funding
for the Coalition, which would make the appointment
of permanent staff challenging. Two respondents supported the current model and two were unclear as to
what approach should be taken.
There was unequivocal support for the current contractual Secretariat arrangement to be reviewed on a
regular basis if this model is retained (on a once every
three-to-five year basis) and also for the competitive
tendering of the contract. Currently those governments
that contribute financially to the working of the Coalition
pay for the Secretariat, and one person thought that
those who contribute financially should determine the
choice of the Secretariat.
On the whole, non-government stakeholders were not
very familiar with the current arrangements, and of
these, 12 expressed no view on the effectiveness of
the governance structure of the Coalition. Those who
did express views did so mainly around improvements
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that could be made to the working groups, such as ensuring geographic diversity, and aligning stakeholder
expectations with the outputs of the working groups.
For example, it was mentioned that there needs to be
clarity on whether/how the Coalition will consider the
output from the working groups and whether it will implement any recommendations.

“There’s a kind of disconnect between
the working groups and the Chair and
Friends of the Chair at the Coalition that
could be improved.”
Lucy Purdon, ICT Project Manager, Institute for
Human Rights and Business

Recommendations
• Introduce a Vice-Chair role while retaining the
current informal arrangements for the selection
of Chair;
• Consider revising the role of Chair such that it
provides strategic direction for the Coalition and
the Vice-Chair hosts of the annual conference;
• Develop concise terms of reference for the
Friends of the Chair group;
• Institute a multi-year contract for the Secretariat
of the Coalition and competitively tender it with
the understanding that the countries contributing
financially to the Secretariat will get to make the
final selection;
• Review the creation of a permanent Secretariat
again when the FOC is more established;
• Align stakeholder expectations and Coalition
governance. Now that the Coalition has other
stakeholders involved, it should create a formal
link between the working groups’ outputs and the
Coalition;
• Take under consideration whether the current
consensus-decision making model could act as a
barrier to implementation of the recommendations
in this report. A more formal structure may need
to be developed to ensure decisions can be made
when consensus cannot be achieved.
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Coalition Efforts13
Interviewees for this project were asked to rate the
importance of different efforts and activities of the Coalition with 1 being not at all important and 5 being very
important.14 Notably, most activities have a relatively
high score, with the exception of the publication of FOC
statements and the side events at other conferences
such as the IGF. The FOC annual conferences were
also not rated as highly by external stakeholders not
currently involved in the Coalition.
When asked about the future areas of focus for the
FOC over the next few years, issues relating to terrorism, security and openness, surveillance and the
security of critical infrastructure and how this relates
to Internet freedom were mentioned. In addition to
continuing existing activities, respondents brought up
working on normative standards at a regional level,
beginning to issue government transparency reports,
placing increased focus on diplomatic coordination,
growing Global South membership, and being more
outspoken about the actions of repressive regimes.
13 Respondents were asked to rate the following Coalition efforts:
The Digital Defenders Partnership – A fund administered by
Hivos to help individuals and organizations working in the
digital emergency field.
The Annual Conferences held by the Coalition – Since its
inception, the Coalition has held a conference once a year.
So far, these have been held in The Hague, Tunis, Nairobi,
Tallinn and Ulaanbaatar.
The interchange of ideas and best practice within the Coalition
Attending other conferences such as the IGF – Delegates
from the FOC now regularly attend events such as the IGF
and RightsCon to discuss its work and hold consultations on
specific issues on which the working groups are focused.
The opportunity to work with other stakeholders through
the working groups – In 2013, three working groups were
established that bring FOC members together with NGOs,
industry, and academics. Each working group is co-chaired
by a government representative and a stakeholder.
Off the record meetings between the FOC and NGOs –
These give FOC members the opportunity to hear about the
state of Internet freedom in specific countries.
Publication of FOC statements – The FOC has now issued
a number of statements on specific issues setting out their
position on Internet freedom.
FOC work in regional networks e.g. HRC in Geneva and
UNGA in New York – The FOC is now leveraging its contacts
in New York and Geneva to put forward FOC positions on
relevant resolutions.
14 In the interest of survey length, qualitative feedback about each
activity or effort was not collected from the respondents.
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Respondent Stakeholder Group
Coalition Activity

NGO
(7 respondents)

Academic
(3 respondents)

Company
(4 respondents)

Government
(10 respondents)

External
stakeholders
not involved in
Coalition
(6 respondents)

The opportunity to work with
stakeholders in working groups

4.71

4.33

Internal exchange of best practice between FOC members

4.14

FOC Annual Conferences
Work with regionaldiplomatic
networks e.g. United Nations
General Assembly in New York
and United Nations Human
Rights Council in Geneva

Overall
Average
(30)

4.13

4.40

4.00

4.38

4.67

3.33

4.05

3.75

4.02

3.57

4.00

5.00

4.35

2.75

3.98

4.14

4.67

3.50

3.80

3.00

3.85

Digital Defenders Partnership15

3.86

3.67

3.33

3.39

4.40

3.72

Off-the-record meetings with
NGOs

4.00

3.67

3.00

3.80

3.33

3.73

Side events at conferences such
as the IGF

3.86

3.67

3.13

3.60

2.75

3.48

Publication of FOC s tatements

3.71

2.67

2.75

3.75

3.33

3.43

“The Freedom Online Coalition should
be part of the cutting edge conversations that are happening in the world,
for example the privatization of governance. Governments have the primary
responsibility for security but the private sector owns the vast majority of
critical infrastructure. This has huge implications for free speech and privacy.”
Eileen Donohoe, Director of Global Affairs, Human
Rights Watch

“For the moment I think the Coalition
should work on improving the internal
structure, making the work more meaningful and engage in more best practice
discussions, improve the working groups
and integrate them better into the outputs of the FOC.”
Stefan Heumann, Member of the management of
Stiftung neue verantwortung

Recommendations
• Significantly enhance the FOC’s sharing of
internal best practices. This has the potential to
offer real value to Coalition members, particularly
those whose policies in the area of Internet
freedom are less well developed;
• Develop a concise statement of goals and the
ways in which the Coalition’s activities facilitate
meeting these goals. This should include the role
of other stakeholders involved in the work of the
FOC.

Funding
The FOC’s current funding comes from voluntary
contributions by member governments with additional
funding from industry for specific activities such as the
annual conference and travel support for civil society
members. The FOC budget has evolved over the past
five years as the Coalition activities have expanded and
developed, and it has fluctuated according to individual
member states’ available funds. When compared to the
other organizations reviewed for this work that make

15 There was support for the Digital Defenders Partnership, but several respondents made the comment that they didn’t necessarily think it 		
needed to be connected to the FOC.
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financial information available on their website, the
FOC’s budget is considerably lower.
All stakeholders were asked whether the FOC currently
has sufficient money to meet its mandate and whether it
should consider other sources of funding, for example,
from foundations or industry. FOC members were also
asked whether all governments should be required to
make some financial contribution to the running of the
Coalition.
Non-government interviewees were mostly not aware
of the of the Coalition’s budget position (16 respondents
answered ‘Don’t Know’ to the question of whether the
FOC’s budget was sufficient to meet its mandate).
Eight (of ten) government respondents felt the FOC’s
funding was insufficient, and the two who felt it was
sufficient noted that it was not stable.
Eighteen respondents were in favor of other funding
sources being considered, but for most of them, it
was important that this be transparent, on a case-bycase basis, and for specific projects. The other ten
respondents were of the fairly strong opinion that the
Coalition should not receive outside sources of funding
(two declined to offer their opinion), because it could
effectively put governments in competition with civil
society groups for limited external funding.
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“I think it would have to be very clear
what is supported by the private sector
but for specific activities I think there is
value in exploring other possible funding.”
Australian government official

FOC members were largely in favor (seven out of ten)
of a financial contribution requirement from all member
governments, but registered concern about it being a
potential barrier to entry for developing nations.

Recommendations
• Be more transparent about the finances of the
FOC via the website;
• On a case-by-case basis, other funding sources
could be sought for specific projects in a way
that does not place the FOC in a position where it
is competing for funds with civil society;
• Draft a public statement about the ways in which
the FOC will approach funding which should
include a commitment to funding the day-to-day
activities solely through member contributions;
• A simple, tiered funding model should be
developed for member countries, including a
nominal contribution for developing nations.
Within the tiered system there should be an
option of no financial contribution in order to not
disincentivize developing nation membership.
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Conclusions
Overall, the interviews conducted as part of this evaluation revealed support for the existence of the Coalition,
support for it remaining government only, strong support for the creation of the working groups and their
potential added value, as well as confidence from government representatives in the Coalition’s outputs in
the diplomatic arena. However, respondents frequently
cited the need to sharpen the Coalition’s aims and objectives, clarify ongoing membership commitments and
address accountability in terms of whether members
are upholding those commitments. It is evident from
their willingness to take part in this evaluation that respondents are invested in the future successes of the
Coalition, but there was substantial criticism of the
Coalition to date from non-government respondents,
particularly around plugging the gap between the working groups and the lack of tangible outcomes so far.
Now in its fifth year, the FOC’s success is somewhat
dependent on its ability to mature as an organization
and take steps to increase its legitimacy through better understanding of whether member commitments
are being met. The involvement of other stakeholders
in the Coalition through the working groups marks an
important evolution in the trajectory of the FOC but it
has also generated different expectations for the Coalition’s accountability. It is vital that the Coalition address
these concerns or the future active participation of other stakeholders may be at risk.

Recommendations
Contention around some recommendations in this
evaluation will be inevitable, and the current consensus
decision-making model of the FOC could be a potential barrier to making necessary changes. The utility of
this decision-making model needs to be considered as
the Coalition works out its response to the report and
implements its next steps.

Clarifying the aims and objectives of the
Coalition
Interviewees were vehement about the need to explicate the aims and objectives of the Coalition given the
many new activities the FOC has taken on in the last few
years, the involvement of other stakeholders directly in
its work, and the new reality following the Snowden revelations. The lack of clarity makes it difficult to measure
whether the FOC is meeting its mandate. Clarifying
the coalition’s intentions and function (including the involvement of non-government representatives in the
working groups) should begin immediately, followed by
the development of an internal monitoring framework,
complete with success indicators. The Foundation
Declaration from the Hague Conference and the recommendations at the Tallinn Conference several years
later lay out the fundamentals of the FOC’s work and
can be used to create standards against which the
FOC can be assessed.

The FOC has the opportunity to leverage its distinctive
governmental composition and lead critically important
conversations on how governments can live up to their
Internet freedom commitments and objectives in the
current complex environment. This will be difficult to
do but has the potential to produce important concrete
results.

Increasing accountability

“The most important thing for me is
an acknowledgement of tensions that
have arisen and how to create the right
incentives for deep engagement and
collaboration.”

Along these lines, the lack of consequences for
members of the FOC who are not meeting their commitments, or who have changed their approach to
Internet freedom since becoming members, is a significant concern. In contrast to the five organizations
reviewed comparatively, although there is no common
approach, they all stipulate expectations that have potential consequences if they are violated. This is one of
the most important areas for the Coalition to address.
The FOC should consider introducing a special work-

Chris Riley, Head of Public Policy, Mozilla

Stakeholders need a mechanism whereby they can
raise concerns about a member government. Creation
of a light touch, preliminary model should be prioritized
by the FOC and should include a requirement that the
country of concern will respond to the issue.
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ing group to begin the introduction of a periodic review
of members, along with a publicly available timeline for
the implementation, which could include an acknowledgment that it will take some time to develop.
The current model is detrimental to its internal and external credibility. Minimum membership commitments
should be developed, for example, attendance at the
annual conference.

Developing the funding of the Coalition
The Coalition is funded mainly through the voluntary
contributions of a handful of members. A tiered fee
structure for membership of the Coalition should be
introduced. Members should be encouraged to make
a financial contribution, but it should be voluntary in
order to not disincentivize the membership of states
with fewer financial resources to join.
Multi-year financial commitments from the FOC would
enable an ongoing commitment to the Secretariat,
and should be introduced. In the longer term, the
FOC should consider whether it needs a permanent
dedicated Secretariat.

Improving governance
The involvement of other stakeholders in the working
groups has complicated expectations among
stakeholders. The interviews revealed a disconnection
between the FOC and the working groups. The lack of
clarity about the fate of work they produce is resulting in
dissatisfaction among working group members. A more
formalized link should be built into the governance
structure with a commitment that the FOC will consider
the output from working groups.
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Improving external communications
Diplomatic coordination is an important part of the
Coalition’s work but it is not currently visible to anyone
outside the FOC government members. Finding a way
to address this through partially transparent measures,
such as articulation of the different types of activities
that take place, along with several examples that
preserve confidentiality, would benefit the external
validity and reputation of the Coalition.
Many of the non-government stakeholders involved in
this evaluation were not familiar with the governance
processes of the Coalition, for example its funding
situation or even the basic process by which
governments join. Some of the recommendations
listed earlier in this report, such as creating clearer
entry criteria, are the precursors to being able to
communicate more effectively.

In closing
As a young organization, many of the challenges
and concerns raised by those interviewed for this
evaluation can be attributed to growing pains and the
need for institutional maturity. However, this is not to
say that the challenges faced by the FOC cannot also
be attributed to what are now apparent structural flaws.
Remediation of key governance issues, the creation
of basic accountability mechanism for members, and
clarity on what the Coalition is trying to achieve are
essential. It is also critically important that the Coalition
works to get itself onto firmer financial footing.
There is hope that the FOC can be a real changemaking organization, given its unique composition
of governments and the recent involvement of other
stakeholders at the table. However, the FOC is currently having trouble navigating the fraught post-Snowden
landscape to place itself at the center of difficult conversations that need to be had, and where the Coalition
could be exceptionally suited for action. Its challenge in
the coming years is to do this.
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Annex A
Full list of coalition members
(As of February 5, 2016)
Australia
Austria
Canada
Costa Rica
The Czech Republic
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Ireland
Japan
Kenya
Latvia
Lithuania
The Maldives
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
The Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Spain
Sweden
Tunisia
United Kingdom
United States
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Annex B
Comparison of other organizations

(based on their website information in January 2016)

Community of
Democracies (CD)

Open Government
Partnership (OGP)

International Code
of Conduct on
Private Security
Service Providers Association
(ICOCA)

Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human
Rights (Voluntary Principles)

Extractives Industry
Transparency Initiative (EITI)

What stakeholder groups
are members
of the organization?

CD is a government
only coalition. Civil
society, parliamentarians, the private
sector, youth, and
academia are also
involved in its work.

OGP is a government coalition that
involves civil society
in its work. There are
also partnerships with
seven multilateral
agencies including
the World Bank, the
Asia Development
Bank, and the Organization for American
States.

ICOCA is a multistakeholder organization with governments, companies
and NGOs. Organizations can also be
observers.

The Voluntary Principles is
a multistakeholder model
including governments,
companies, and NGOs.
There are also organizations that are observers of
the Voluntary Principles.

The EITI is a multistakeholder coalition
including governments, companies,
NGOs, institutional
investors, and partner
organizations.

What is the
size of the
organization?

106 governments

69 governments

6 governments, 14
civil society organizations, over 700
private security
companies

9 governments, 28 corporations, 10 NGOs

49 countries, over 90
companies, 9 NGOs

When was the
organization
founded?

2000

2011

2010

2000

2003

What is the
process for
joining?

Prospective members
will be evaluated
based on their support for emerging and
transitional democracies, their participation in the UN
Democracy Caucus,
designation of a senior official to act as
the point of contact,
and tangible contributions to strengthening
CD.

There is a section on
the website that explains the process for
joining. This involves
achieving a minimum
level of commitment
to open government in the areas of
fiscal transparency,
access to information, income and
asset disclosures and
citizen engagement,
submitting a letter of
intent, and identifying
a lead agency or ministry to develop the
government action
plan. The website
displays a spreadsheet of the current
status of member
governments compared to the eligibility
criteria.

Organizations wanting to join submit an
application that is reviewed by the Secretariat with the Board
making the decision
on membership. It is
also possible to be an
observer member of
ICOCA.

Applications are sent to the
Secretariat and decisions
on membership are made
by the Steering Committee.

There are several
different processes
for different
stakeholders
joining the EITI.
Governments
can either be
implementing
countries or
supporting countries.
There are different
obligations for
each. Companies,
investors and NGOs
indicate their interest
in joining the EITI,
to support the
implementation of the
EITI standards and
consider a voluntary
financial contribution.

MEMBERSHIP
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Community of
Democracies (CD)

Open Government
Partnership (OGP)

International Code
of Conduct on
Private Security
Service Providers Association
(ICOCA)

Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human
Rights (Voluntary Principles)

Extractives Industry
Transparency Initiative (EITI)

What are the
commitments
of membership?

The commitments of
CD members are set
out in the Warsaw
Declaration of 2000,
which includes 19
core democratic
principles.

Joining the OGP
entails committing to
the Open Government Declaration
of 2011, delivering
a country action
plan developed with
public consultation,
and committing to
independent reporting on progress going
forward.

Joining ICOCA
means committing to
their code of conduct,
and certification depends on compliance
with the code.

A set of principles articulate
the steps member companies need to take to respect
human rights while maintaining the security and
safety of their operations.

The EITI is a global
standard focused on
the management of
natural resources in
an open and accountable way. Countries
are responsible for
implementing the
standards.

Is there a process for removing members
or assessing
whether they
are meeting
their commitments? If so,
what triggers
this?

The Council can
suspend membership
by consensus for
unconstitutional interruption or deviation
from the democratic
process.

OGP has adopted
a Response Policy
to enable concerns
about members to be
raised. Responses
to issues raised
are made public
through their website.
Members are also
required to produce
a self-assessment
report, which is also
made public.

ICOCA is a certification model for companies. This commits
the companies to
ongoing independent
monitoring and evaluation. Companies
are also required to
report regularly on
their performance.
There is a process in
place for complaints
to be raised and for
companies to be suspended if they have
violated the code.

A government’s status in
the Voluntary Principles
will be reviewed if there is
consensus in one constituency that the government
is committing genocide,
widespread or systematic war crimes or crimes
against humanity. There is
no similar process for the
review of either companies or NGOs, although
NGOs must submit a letter
each year requesting their
continued involvement in
the Voluntary Principles.
The Voluntary Principles
has a separate verification
framework outlined for each
type of member.

Implementing countries are required to
publish the revenue
they receive and
companies also publish figures to enable
comparison between
the two. Implementing countries can be
suspended from the
EITI process. Two are
currently suspended.

What is the
governance
structure?

There is a Secretary
General, a 28-country
Governing Council
and an International
Steering Committee. An Executive
Committee assists
the Presidency which
rotates between
members of the Governing Council every
two years.

A Steering Committee oversees the development of OGP’s
work. There are four
co-chairs. There are
also 2 OGP ambassadors.

There is a Board of
Directors with 12
members and equal
representation from
all stakeholders. The
General Assembly
is a meeting of all
members and takes
place at least once
a year.

The Plenary is the Voluntary Principle’s decision
making body and the
Steering Committee is the
main executive body of the
Voluntary Principles. The
Voluntary Principles Association addresses financial
and administrative issues.

There is an independent Board Chair and
a Board of 20, with
representation of different stakeholders.
A conference is held
every 3 years for all
members.

Is there a
Secretariat?

There is a permanent Secretariat of
7 plus the Secretary
General.

There is a permanent
Secretariat of 14.

There is a permanent
Secretariat of five.

The Secretariat for the
Voluntary Principles is provided by the Washington,
DC based law firm Foley
Hoag.

There is a permanent
Secretariat of 24.

STRUCTURE
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Community of
Democracies (CD)
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Open Government
Partnership (OGP)

International Code
of Conduct on
Private Security
Service Providers Association
(ICOCA)

Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human
Rights (Voluntary Principles)

Extractives Industry
Transparency Initiative (EITI)

Promoting democracy and democratic values is done
through working
groups focused on
a number of issues
including governance
and effectiveness,
enabling civil society
and improving electoral practices. There
are also initiatives
relating to specific
countries. Ministerial
conferences are held
and there is capacity
building work with
civil society. The CD
gives several awards
and prizes, such as
the Geremek Award.
It also works to
support transitional
states (e.g. Tunisia)
that have shown
progress toward
democracy via its
“Democracy Partnership” initiative.

The focus of their activities is on advancing open government
in member countries
to benefit citizens.
They achieve this
by ensuring open
government policy
debates continue at
the highest levels,
supporting local
reformers, fostering
engagement with a
wider range of stakeholders and holding
countries accountable for the progress
they are making in
achieving their commitments.

The ICOCA promotes, governs, and
oversees the ICOCA
code. This includes
providing certification
for member companies that meet the
standard; reporting,
monitoring, and assessing the performance of member
companies; and
handling complaints
that come in about
member companies
and potential violations of the code.

The Voluntary Principles is
focused on the extractives
industry (oil, mining, and
gas companies and related
governments and NGOs).
The principles embodied in
the code, that companies
respect human rights while
securing their operations,
form its core activities. The
emphasis of work is on mutual learning, best practice
sharing, and joint problem
solving with different stakeholders. An annual plenary
meeting takes place for all
members. Each participant
in the Voluntary Principles
is required to submit an
annual report detailing what
they are doing to implement
or support the implementation of the Voluntary
Principles.

Implementing the
EITI standards is
the key activity. This
includes training and
capacity building,
validating the work
of implementing
countries, considering the applications
of new countries,
raising awareness of
the standards, and
publishing process
and country reports.
Work is currently
underway to look at
how the EITI can play
a more active role
in the public policy
process.

How is the
organization
financed?

There is no information about the financing of the CD on their
website.

Foundations, bilateral
agencies and governments fund the OGP
with occasional company contributions.

ICOCA is funded
primarily by its
members. Government contributions
are voluntary. It
also receives funding from industry
member dues and
the one-time joining
fee for applying
members. Additionally, the Government
of Switzerland and
the Geneva Centre
for the Democratic
Control of Armed
Forces (DCAF) make
significant in-kind
contributions.

The Voluntary Principles
is financed by government
and corporate member
contributions.

Companies, governments, and development agencies
provide the funding.
The majority of the
funding comes from
governments and development agencies
(62% in 2014).

What is the
budget for the
organization?

There is no information about the budget
of the CDs on their
website.

The OGP’s 2014
revenue was $4.5
million.

ICOCA’s 2016 budget
is $1.1 million.

There is no information
about the budget of the
Voluntary Principles on
their website.

In 2014 the EITI’s
revenue was $5
million.

FOCUS OF ACTIVITIES
What are the
key activities of
the organization?

FINANCES
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Takeaways:
• Membership in each organization is based on a commitment to rights and principles.
• In terms of basic structure, the Communities of Democracies, despite its massive size and extremely broad
focus, is most similar to the FOC as a coalition of nation states that involves other stakeholders in its work.
The Voluntary Principles, ICOCA, and EITI all have formal multistakeholder structures. The OGP also involves civil society in the governance of its work.
• All five organizations are more established and institutionalized than the Freedom Online Coalition. CD and
EITI have been in existence for much longer.
• They all have much more formal governance structures and with the exception of the Voluntary Principles,
a permanent Secretariat. It is common to have a smaller steering committee or council for decision making
independent of the full membership.
• All five organizations have significantly larger budgets and/or greater resources than the FOC.
• All of the comparable organizations have guidelines for continued membership and procedures for removal
or suspension of non-compliant members.
• The goal of each organization drives the level of involvement of corporate and NGO partners. Organizations
focused on the activities of companies (the Voluntary Principles and EITI) provide a much larger governance role for those stakeholders.
• Particularly in those organizations where governments play a larger membership role, funding comes
largely from partner governments.
• Community of Democracies, due to its extremely broad focus and significant resources, may be hard to
emulate, whereas OGP has comparably sized goals and focus to the FOC.
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